Chip-and-pin is *not* broken
I've seen this article about the supposed security holes with chip-and-pin credit cards making the rounds lately. As with my previous article on smartcard PINs, I have just enough knowledge to be dangerous. Which in this case means just enough knowledge to tell you why this latest attack on chip cards is not a very exciting one.
In short, the attackers in the above article have revealed a simple way for anyone to use a stolen chip credit card, without knowing the PIN, regardless of whether or not the credit card reader is online at the time. This security hole is real. I'm not disputing that.
However, it's also not as bad as people are making it sound. Most importantly, chip cards are not even *close* to as insecure as the old ("magstripe") cards they were designed to replace. And while those old cards had annoyingly high levels of fraud, you as a consumer really didn't need to care, because big faceless megacorporations paid for it. In this case, it's still more secure than before, so you should care even less than before.
Here are three reasons why the current security hole is not very exciting:
1. You have to *physically steal the card*.
Most fraud on magstripe cards was from *copying*: anyone with a bit of technical skill can trivially copy a magstripe card just by buying a magstripe writer device for less than $200. Since magstripes are used all over for much more than just financial stuff, there's no regulation about who can buy such devices.
So a common form of attack on magstripes is social engineering. It works like this: go into a store where they swipe your card on a machine. The machine then says "card read error" or "denied" or whatever, and you give up and use a different card or cash. Or maybe they try again on a different terminal, and it mysteriously succeeds this time. But in the meantime, the first terminal has recorded the data on your magstripe - probably less than 1k of data per card. The criminal can pick up the data later, and use it to clone any card that has ever been read by the illegal reader.
Ah, but what about your signature on the back of the card? And how about the hologram of your face that's on some cards? How do they copy *that*, huh? Easy, they don't: they just rewrite the magstripe on a card with *their* picture and signature on it. When they take it to a store, the card is physically theirs, but the account number is yours, so they're spending your money, not theirs. Ouch.
Better still, they can simply re-rewrite the magstripe on their card back to their original identity later, leaving little evidence.
So anyway, be suspicious of any vendor who tries to scan your card but then it "fails," especially if they look like they were expecting it. If their reader was *that* unreliable, they would have stopped using it by now. Report them to your bank. It might help them find some fraudsters.
But anyway, that form of fraud is soon to disappear: your credit card still has a magstripe, but it's only for backwards compatibility with old magstripe-only readers. Chip cards are completely immune to this sort of attack, because the chip interface doesn't tell you the card number: it only gives the reader a one-time transaction authorization code, which you can't use to construct a new card.
Of course, someone who clones your card's magstripe can still copy and use it in a magstripe reader, so you're still susceptible to fraud. But it gets less valuable every day, and vendors who sell expensive stuff - the ideal fraud targets - are the first to upgrade their readers to support chip cards. Someday the magstripe "feature" will be safely turned off entirely.
(It *is* still possible to read the real account number and secret key information from a chip card and therefore clone it. But it requires extremely messy and unreliable equipment. As far as I know, there are no simple, reliable machines that can do this in a store setting without arousing suspicion. Moreover, any such machine would obviously have only-nefarious purposes, so you'll never be able to buy one for $200 like you can with general purpose magstripe devices.)
By the way, the extra "security code" on the back of your card is a partial protection against the card-copying attack: the security code isn't on the magstripe. So someone who copies your card can't use it for web purchases that need the security code, unless they manually write down the security code while stealing your card, and that would be too obvious. (Unless you're at a restaurant, and the server takes your card into a back room for "processing." But you wouldn't ever let them do that, right?)
2. You have to hack the *vendor's* card reading terminal.
Another handy thing about the old magstripe card attacks is they work at any store, on any credit card terminal. (Nowadays they only work at terminals that *don't* support chip cards, because the bank refuses magstripe transactions from chip-capable terminals on chip-capable cards. Getting better!)
That means the standard form of attack would be to steal your card number at a shady corner store or restaurant, then delay for an arbitrary amount of time - you don't want it to be too obvious which shady store stole the number, since they probably stole a bunch all at the same time. Then, take it to an expensive store like Future Shop and buy stuff... untraceably. It has your name on it, not the fraudster, and the vendor is Future Shop, not the fraudster. The perfect crime.
With the chip card hack we're discussing, your crime isn't so perfect anymore. Above, I said that you need to *steal* the card instead of copying it. That's hard enough to do, but it's doubly hard for another reason: the owner will probably notice and immediately call their bank to cancel it. That means you can't wait a few weeks or months before using the stolen card - you have to do it *fast*, before the owner notices. So even if you come up with a clever way of stealing cards in large quantities, it'll be a lot easier for the police to track down the theft just by using statistics.
But even worse, to execute the chip-card-without-PIN hack, you have to break the card *reader* device and make it lie to both the card and the bank. That's not so hard to do, if you're an excellent programmer. Much harder than just copying a magstripe, which any halfway competent techie could do with off-the-shelf equipment. But yes, as with any DRM, it's crackable, so somebody can do it. Based on the "Chip and PIN is Broken" paper, someone already has.
What's *much* harder, though, is getting a store to *use* your hacked card reader on their merchant account. You can't just walk into Future Shop and hand them a card and a special card reader and say, "Yeah, charge it to this." No, you'll have to *infiltrate* a Future Shop and get them to use your special card reader. Not only is that much more traceable - suddenly there are people at Future Shop who *know* who the criminal is - but it's also not much easier than just stealing the stupid TV in the first place. I mean, if you can sneak into Future Shop, then you can sneak out of Future Shop, right?
Or you could get your own merchant account, I guess, and charge the money through that. But no... not likely. What could be more traceable than opening a merchant account at a bank and then running fraudulent transactions through it? I'm sure there's some way to use a fake identity or something, but again, that's *way* harder than walking into a chain store, buying something, and walking out again.
3. The only reason it even works is for backwards compatibility.
The third reason this attack is rather boring is that it exploits an *optional* feature of the EMV specification. Essentially, they independently convince the card, and the bank, that they really don't need a PIN today. In a simpler world, that would be impossible; the card would demand a PIN, and the bank would demand a PIN-authenticated transaction. But because of backwards compatibility and maybe some too-flexible specifications, it's possible to convince the card that the bank has authenticated the PIN, *and* convince the bank that the card has authenticated the PIN, all at the same time.
Yes, it's a real security hole caused by specification bugs; that attack simply shouldn't be possible to do. And yes, because of that attack, a physically stolen card can be used on a hacked card reader without knowing the PIN, so banks should worry about fraud.
But from my reading of the EMV specification (the spec is available for free online, by the way; google it), the particular modes that make this attack possible are optional. You can just turn them off. Banks just don't want to, because in some situations, those modes let you do a transaction (ie. spend money, thus earning the bank money) where you otherwise couldn't.
If I understand correctly - and maybe I don't, as I didn't read the exact form of the attack too carefully - the main point of confusion is that PINs can be verified either online (by the bank) or offline (by the card), and which one we use is determined by a negotiation between the card, the reader, and the bank. (Interestingly, exactly this was the focus of my previous article on chip cards.) If the reader lies to the card and says the bank isn't available right now (offline mode), and lies to the bank and says the card has requested offline PIN verification (maybe the card is set to *require* offline verification; that's one of the options in the spec), then the transaction can go through.
Moreover, the bank will store a "PIN Verified" flag that supposedly means the transaction is known to be much safer than an unverified (eg. magstripe) transaction. That might tell a bank's auto-fraud-detection algorithms to relax more than they should, which is probably the *real* story here. (If you're a bank, you should care about this security hole. If you're a normal person, probably not.)
Bonus trivia: incentives
By the way, here's a bit of information I ran into that I found interesting:
In the magstripe days, most fraud was by default considered the responsibility of the *vendor*. That is, if a store accepted a fraudulent card and you later reversed the transaction, it was the store who lost the money, not the bank. This seems really cruel to store owners, but the idea was that if you don't give them an incentive to reject faked cards, then they won't be careful. For example, a store has no reason to check your signature or your photo id if it's not them who'll lose in case of fraud. In fact, they have an incentive to *not* check those things, since checking them slows them down, costs money, and discourages you from shopping there. (Plus, a store can make their own decisions about how careful they want to be. Do we want a fast checkout line in exchange for higher fraud, or a slow checkout line with less fraud? What saves us the most money in the long run?)
Remember, even without professional magstripe fraud, there was still the even more trivial low-tech kind: a teenager steals a credit card from their parents' wallet, walks into a store, and buys something. Signature/photo checks are really hopelessly weak, but at least they reduce *that*.
Now, putting all the blame on the vendor was supposedly the default, but I suspect it wasn't what actually happened. I'm guessing that, officially or unofficially, if it was proven that a real forged card was used - as opposed to the vendor just not checking the signature carefully enough - that the bank would take on some of the loss. Maybe half, maybe all of it, who knows.
As magstripe fraud got more and more out of control, the industry started switching to chip cards. The problem is, you can't switch the entire world from magstripe to chip all in one day. It's a chicken-and-egg problem. So how do you make it worthwhile for banks to start issuing chip cards - since magstripe fraud isn't their problem - *and* for stores to upgrade to chip readers?
Someone somewhere (in government, perhaps?) came up with a neat solution: we'll change the liability rules. Nowadays it works like this: if a vendor has a chip-capable reader, card fraud is the bank's fault, so they pay for it. If a vendor only has an old magstripe reader, the vendor pays for it. And this is true whether or not the particular credit card is chip capable, because if it's not, then it's the bank's fault for not issuing a newer card.
I find this to be an extremely clever social hack. It aligns everybody's best interests toward reducing fraud, but requires no fines, laws, agreed-upon industry-wide schedules, deprecation periods, or enforcement.
The "Chip and PIN is Broken" attack:
- only works if your card is physically stolen;
- only works if the criminal uses a traceable vendor with a modified terminal;
- can be disabled someday by turning off some optional protocol features;
- is a liability issue for banks and/or vendors, but not consumers like you.
- If your card is stolen, report it immediately.
- If a vendor has trouble reading your card and doesn't look surprised, consider reporting it to your bank.
- Yes, you still need to monitor your bank statement for incorrect transactions (not just for fraud; incompetence remains rampant too).
- If anyone asks you whether chip cards are more secure than the alternatives, say YES YES OH GOD YES, PLEASE PLEASE LET THE OLD SYSTEM DIE NOW.